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There is a good case to be made for Cyprus 
pressing ahead with full recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence
Cyprus is one of the five EU member states that refuse 
to recognise the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. 
James Ker-Lindsay writes that a recent meeting 
between the Cypriot Foreign Minister and the Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister of Kosovo suggests that 
the country’s stance may be softening over the issue. He notes that 
although this may seem surprising given Cyprus’s own dispute with the 
self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, it is in keeping with 
changing attitudes among other EU member states and a shift in Cypriot 
foreign policy. He also argues that if a change is to be made, there is a 
good case for pressing ahead with full recognition.
By all accounts, it was an extraordinary photo. On 24 September, the 
chief of staff of the Kosovo prime minister Tweeted a picture of Prime 
Minister Hashim Thaci and Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj having 
breakfast with Ioannis Kasoulides, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, on 
the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. For a senior 
official of a country that has spent thirty years trying to prevent the 
recognition of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC), and has taken an extremely vocal stance against Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence, it was a quite extraordinary 
development. However, in the context of wider developments, and 
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recent signals that Cypriot foreign policy is being realigned, it is actually 
a rather less surprising development than one might believe.
Changing views amongst the EU five
Ever since 
Kosovo 
declared 
independence, in February 2008, it has proven to be one of the most 
divisive foreign policy issues within the European Union. On the one 
hand, there are the vast majority of the 28 members that have opted to 
recognise it. Ranged against them are five members – Cyprus, Greece, 
Romania, Slovakia and Spain – that have resolutely refused to 
acknowledge Kosovo’s full independence as a sovereign state. 
However, this situation now appears to be changing. While Spain 
remains adamantly opposed to recognition, especially as Catalonia 
becomes all the more vocal in pressing its claim for independence, 
there are clear signals that Romania, Slovakia and Greece and 
reconsidering their positions.
In recent months, Victor Ponta, the prime minister of Romania, has 
openly stated that Bucharest should move towards recognising Kosovo. 
Although this will not happen in the short-term, given that such a move 
is strongly opposed by the president, Traian Basescu, it now seems to 
be a matter of time before Romania opts to join the EU majority. 
Likewise, opinion in Slovakia is shifting. It is well known that Miroslav 
Lajcak, the Slovak Foreign Minister, is keen to see his country 
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recognise Kosovo and makes little attempt to hide his meetings with 
officials from Kosovo. In this case, though, the situation is rather more 
difficult due to a parliamentary resolution against recognition. However, 
it seems likely that this can and will be reversed; especially if another 
one or two of the five non-recognisers change their positions. Indeed, 
the Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee has already signalled his 
wish to take wider soundings on the country’s position on Kosovo.
Meanwhile, Greece is edging closer and closer to full recognition. In 
fact, of the five non-recognisers, it already has the strongest relations 
with Pristina. In March this year, the then Foreign Minister, Dimitris 
Avramopoulos, invited Foreign Minister Hoxhaj for formal meetings at 
the foreign ministry in Athens, and in doing so used his official title; a 
significant development as the post of foreign minister is the one 
position that is intimately tied up with statehood.
In private, Greek diplomats go even further and admit that Athens is 
poised to recognise Kosovo. As they explain, the only thing that is 
holding Greece back is not the country’s traditional friendship with 
Serbia, which has been strained over Belgrade’s support for Macedonia 
on the name issue, but concerns about how this would be read by the 
Cypriots. But even this is perhaps less a concern now; not least of all 
because Cypriot officials have said that they understand the position 
Greece finds itself in with its European partners and why it might wish to 
earn some goodwill be recognising Kosovo. It therefore appears 
increasingly likely that Athens will change its policy, despite continuing 
denials that it will do so.
New direction in Cypriot foreign policy
The fact that Cyprus sympathised with the Greek position did not in 
itself mean that it was willing to alter its strong opposition to Kosovo’s 
independence. Indeed, up until recently, it was seen as the most hard 
line member of the five. As President Papadopoulos stated soon after 
Kosovo declared independence, ‘Cyprus will not recognise Kosovo even 
if Serbia does.’ However, the fact that positions are changing in 
Slovakia and Romania, as well as Greece, increasingly threaten to put 
Cyprus in a rather difficult position of being left in a minority of two over 
Kosovo. It is no secret that Nicosia is desperately trying to shake off its 
reputation as the ‘single issue member state’. Although the continuing 
division of the island remains the ‘National Issue’, Cypriot officials are 
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keen to stress that Cyprus is now more than its ‘problem’. For example, 
it was very noticeable that the Cyprus issue was kept firmly off the 
agenda during the Cypriot presidency of the European Union in the 
second half of 2012.
Meanwhile, the election of a new centre-right government, in February 
this year, has seen a major shift in the country’s general foreign policy 
orientation. Long a stalwart of the non-aligned movement, and 
traditionally close to Russia, under President Anastasiades and Foreign 
Minister Kasoulides, who was an MEP before returning to Cyprus to 
take up the foreign affairs portfolio (which he actually held before), steps 
have been taken to align Cyprus firmly with the West. Perhaps the most 
noticeable sign of this has been talk of membership of NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace, leading eventually to full membership; a policy 
that would have been unthinkable even five years ago.
The problem of engagement
For all these reasons, any decision to ease the previous policy over 
Kosovo, if that is really what is happening, would be rather less 
surprising than may at first appear. More to the point, there are signs 
that wider public and political opinion may also be easing on the 
question of Kosovo; not that it was ever a major issue of public concern. 
Notably, the photo passed all but unnoticed in the Cyprus press. Nor 
have any of the other political parties sought to raise the issue. (It also 
perhaps helps that DIKO, the party that is generally regarded as being 
the most hard line on the Cyprus issue, is a member of the ruling 
coalition.) To this extent, if the breakfast meeting was a trial balloon for 
a policy shift, it has certainly not been shot down.
If indeed it was an attempt to test the waters, the general lack of 
reaction would suggest that there would appear to be room for the 
government to now take matters further. The big question is what 
should, or could, come next? A policy of constructive engagement with 
Kosovo, along the lines of Greece and Slovakia, is an obvious route that 
would clearly signal that Cyprus is now willing to be constructive on the 
issue of Kosovo. However, matters are not quite as straightforward for 
Cyprus as for the others. Indeed, there is a good argument to be made 
that if Cyprus does want to take this matter forward it should in fact go a 
lot further. As odd as it may sound, Cyprus would in fact be better off 
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pressing ahead with full recognition, rather than simply increasing 
engagement.
The reasoning behind this is relatively simple. One of the key concerns 
Nicosia has had over the years is not the recognition of the TRNC, but 
its gradual legitimisation; a process of ‘Taiwanisation’ where countries 
increasingly interact with the Turkish Cypriots but stop short of full 
recognition. Speaking with Cypriot diplomats, this is raised time and 
time again as their key worry. Such fears have been fed by various 
efforts to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots after their decision, in 
2004, to vote in favour of a UN sponsored reunification plan (the Annan 
Plan), which was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriot 
community.
Moreover, in recent years, there have been growing calls from the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for steps to be taken by 
Muslim states to ‘strengthen solidarity’ with the ‘Turkish Cypriot State’. 
By engaging with Kosovo, the Cypriot Government runs the risk of 
signalling to other countries around the world that this form of 
engagement without recognition is in fact acceptable. Indeed, it rather 
leaves it open to accusations of hypocrisy if it now tries to condemn 
others for interacting with the Turkish Cypriots in the same way as it 
would be engaging with Kosovo.
The seemingly impossible: recognition?
Faced with this, it may well be easier to stick to the previous policy, with 
all the growing isolation that this would entail. Alternatively, the Cypriot 
government could opt to take a very different route altogether and go as 
far as to recognise Kosovo. While this idea may seem drastically far-
fetched at first, the reality is that such a decision may not be as 
problematic or as difficult as one may imagine. Although Cyprus has 
long opposed recognition, importantly it has never in fact rejected the 
‘unique case’ argument upon which the United States and most of the 
European Union have based their decisions to recognise Kosovo; if only 
to emphasise that Kosovo cannot be a precedent for Cyprus.
Likewise, its position under international law remains strong. Unlike the 
Kosovo UDI, the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence was 
formally condemned by the United Nations Security Council (Resolution 
541), which has called on countries not to recognise the TRNC. 
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Similarly, even the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion
on Kosovo, in July 2010, reaffirmed that the Turkish Cypriot declaration 
of independence was contrary to international law. Finally, as more than 
half the members of the UN now recognise Kosovo, Cyprus can equally 
argue that the tide is clearly flowing in a clear and irreversible direction. 
By recognising Kosovo, Cyprus – like other countries that face a 
secessionist threat, but have chosen to recognise Kosovo, such as 
Canada – would in fact be sending a very clear message that it sees no 
link between the Kosovo situation and its own.
Perhaps most importantly, if Cyprus were to decide to recognise 
Kosovo, it is unlikely that it would face much international condemnation 
or opprobrium, at least not where it counts. As noted, more than half the 
members of the UN have already done so. They are not going to say 
anything untoward. Of the remaining half, many are likely to be mulling 
a change of heart themselves. Meanwhile, for Cyprus’s western 
partners, who have long pushed for wider international acceptance of 
Kosovo, it would definitely be a case of better late than never.
Certainly, they are not going to embarrass Cyprus over its volte-face. 
Indeed, one would expect quite the opposite. Not only would they be 
keen to reaffirm yet again that the two situations are completely 
different, Cyprus could well be rewarded for its change of heart. 
(Especially as this would almost certainly start a chain reaction with 
Greek, Romanian and then Slovak recognition; or could be organised in 
tandem with one or all of them.) With new UN-sponsored Cyprus 
reunification talks on the horizon, a decision to recognise Kosovo could 
well bring some important payback at a crucial time.
Next steps
Of course, it is important to stress that there is nothing concrete at this 
stage. One breakfast does not make a policy change. However, the 
mere decision of the Cypriot foreign minister to sit down in a public 
space with the prime minister and foreign minister of Kosovo is a hugely 
significant development given the previous hard line adopted by 
Nicosia. In view of the changing positions of other EU non-recognisers, 
and the clear intention of the Cypriot government to take a new foreign 
policy course, it could well signal that something is afoot. If so, and as 
counterintuitive as it may seem, there is a very good argument to be 
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made that the next step of engagement should really be the giant leap 
of recognition.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of 
EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of 
Economics.
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sephiakarta  October 3, 2013 at 9:48 pm - Reply
Interesting analysis, thank you. Two small things:
– I don’t see in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion 
on Kosovo any evidence that it “reaffirmed that the Turkish Cypriot 
declaration of independence was contrary to international law”.
– I wouldn’t say that Canada is facing a “secessionist threat”, since it is 
has been so wise as to let Quebec decide for itself whether it wants to 
be independent.
James Ker-Lindsay  October 7, 2013 at 6:07 pm - Reply
Thank you for the comments.
Regarding your first point, the Court clearly noted, and thereby again 
reaffirmed, the illegality of the 1983 Turkish Cypriot declaration of 
independence as determined by the UN Security Council. Paragraph 81 
of the advisory opinion states:
Several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council 
condemning particular declarations of independence: see, inter alia, 
will never become 
part of Serbia again”
14/10/2015http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/10/03/there-is-a-good-case-to-be-made-for-cyp...
Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning 
Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning 
northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), 
concerning the Republika Srpska…The Court notes, however, that in all 
of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as 
regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those 
declarations of independence were made; the *illegality* [My emphasis] 
attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from 
the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact 
that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of 
force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, 
in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens).
Also, paragraph 114 notes:
In this regard the Court notes that contemporaneous practice of the 
Security Council shows that in situations where the Security Council has 
decided to establish restrictive conditions for the permanent status of a 
territory, those conditions are specified in the relevant resolution. For 
example, although the factual circumstances differed from the situation 
in Kosovo, only 19 days after the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999), the 
Security Council, in its resolution 1251 of 29 June 1999, reaffirmed its
position that a “Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus 
with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single 
citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity 
safeguarded” (para. 11). The Security Council thus set out the specific 
conditions relating to the permanent status of Cyprus.
In other words, the permanent existence of the TRNC is contrary to the 
stated will of the Security Council as regards a final settlement in 
Cyprus (unless of course the Greek Cypriots agree to it being so and 
secure a resolution to this effect). 
As for your second point, the fact that the Canadian government agreed 
to give Quebec a democratic say in its future does not mean that it does 
not see Quebec’s secession as a ‘threat’; in rather the same way as the 
British Government views Scottish independence as a threat to be 
countered (see the reports it is producing to highlight the benefits of the 
Union, and the costs for Scotland of leaving), but ultimately accepted if 
that is the democratic wish of the people.
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◦sephiakarta  October 18, 2013 at 6:52 am - Reply
– True, but so the only thing the advisory opinion did 
was cite a possibly relevant factor in a related case 
and show that it does not apply here. It does not state whether 
that factor is in itself sufficient to make secession illegal. 
Moreover, it also provides arguments that suggest the TRNC 
declaration of independence was not illegal either, as “General 
international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations
of independence”.
– True, but what’s at stake here is whether a territory may secede 
at all, and Canada has already conceded that principle. I don’t 
think it was afraid that its recognition of Kosovo makes Quebec 
voters more likely to vote in favour of independence in any future 
referendum.
◾
James Ker-Lindsay  October 18, 2013 at 1:06 pm - 
Reply
No. If you read the ruling, it is saying that 
general international law does not contain a prohibition on 
declarations of independence, except when it does! Cyprus 
was cited as a case where a clear prohibition exists. On 
Northern Cyprus, the Court did take a very clear stand on 
the illegality of its declaration of independence. But, as you 
note, this does not have a bearing on those cases where 
there is no specific prohibition laid down by the Security 
Council or other relevant body.
◾
sephiakarta  October 18, 2013 at 7:51 pm - 
Reply
I’m still convinced that Northern Cyprus 
and the Security Council Resolution are only cited 
as an example of a declaration of independence that 
was considered illegal at the time, by the security 
council
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Note that the Security Council resolution was only 
passed _after_ the declaration of independence, so 
in order to say that the resolution made the 
declaration of independence illegal we have to say 
that the Council has juridical authority (which I would 
dispute), in which case the ICJ is only citing this 
earlier judgement, not confirming it.
◾
Alexy Flemming  October 2, 2014 at 
11:54 am 
Sephia Karta, I totally agree with 
your “ICJ is only citing this earlier judgement, 
NOT CONFIRMING it.” view as well. Lindsay 
did not write all of the paragraph 81. If all of 
the paragraph 81 is written once again, 
everything becomes clear and clear:
P81: The Court notes, however, that in all of 
those instances the Security Council was 
making a determination as regards the 
concrete situation existing at the time that 
those declarations of independence were 
made; the ILLEGALITY ATTACHED to the 
declarations of independence thus stemmed 
not from the unilateral character of these 
declarations as such, but from the fact that 
they were, or WOULD HAVE BEEN, 
connected with the unlawful use of force or 
other egregious violations of norms of general 
international law, in particular those of a 
peremptory character (jus cogens). In the 
context of Kosovo. the Security Council has 
never taken this position. The EXCEPTIONAL 
CHARACTER of the resolutions enumerated 
above appears to the Court to confirm that NO 
GENERAL PROHIBITION against unilateral 
declarations of independence may be inferred 
14/10/2015http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/10/03/there-is-a-good-case-to-be-made-for-cyp...
from the practice of the Security Council.
(end of paragraph 81)
Question1 : Who attached “illegality” to 
Declaration of Independence (DOI) of 
Northern Cyprus? UN SC or ICJ?
Answer 1: UN Security Council, of course. ICJ 
only cites this attachment. ICJ does NOT 
make any decision or statement about a 
country’s legality or DOI unless it is requested 
to do so; as in the case of Kosovo: “Is the 
unilateral declaration of independence by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo in accordance with international 
law?”. Inter alia:
Question 2: Was ICJ requested to give an 
advisory opinion on “declaration of 
independence of Northern Cyprus”?
Answer 2: No!
Question 3: In paragraph 81, ICJ is 
mentioning “WOULD HAVE BEEN” and 
“EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER”. By this, what 
does ICJ imply?
Answer 3: ICJ is implying that THE 
RESOLUTIONS OF UN SC on DOIs of ONLY 
SOME of the countries are TOTALLY 
ARBITRARY and TOTALLY 
DISCRETIONARY (i.e. DOES NOT DEPEND 
ON ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW. Remember: 
The President of the Int’l Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Hisashi Owada, 2010: “International law 
contains “NO PROHIBITION” on declarations 
of independence.”).
(Dear Lindsay, this “NO PROHIBITION” 
includes “UN SC’s restrictive conditions for 
the permanent status of a territory” as well!)
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ICJ is emphasizing this DISCRETIONARY 
and SELF-ORDAINEDNESS of UN SC via 
phrase additions and humiliations like 
“EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER”; and adding 
“WOULD HAVE BEEN” next to “they WERE, 
or would have been, connected with the 
unlawful use of force” to show that “UN SC’s 
CONNECTING to UNLAWFUL use of force” 
may even be TOTALLY BASELESS (ICJ did 
not pass only with “were connected” in the 
sentence!): By saying “TOTALLY 
BASELESS”, Remember (inter alia):
(1) The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE): On 29 July 1974, 
PACE affirmed (via Resolution 573) that the 
Turkish military intervention was the exercise 
of a RIGHT EMANATING FROM AN 
INTERNATIONAL TREATY and the 
FULLFILMENT OF A LEGAL and moral 
OBLIGATION.
(2) Greece’s Athens Court of Appeals 
(21.03.1979; Case No: 2658/79): “The Turkish 
military INTERVENTION in Cyprus, which 
was carried out in accordance with the Zurich 
and London Accords, was LEGAL. Turkey, as 
one of the Guarantor Powers, had the right lo 
fulfill her obligations. The real culprits . . . are 
the Greek officers who engineered and staged 
a coup and prepared the conditions for this 
INTERVENTION”.
ICJ’s using of “UN SC’s restrictive conditions 
for the permanent status of a territory” does 
not mean “ICJ believes such a non-existence 
of a restrictive condition for the DOI of a 
country to be legal; BUT RATHER: it only 
means the objections of the countries towards 
“DOI of Kosovo” is BASELESS EVEN FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF OBJECTING 
COUNTRIES! Namely, such a condition is not 
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in the perspective/framework of ICJ (Because: 
President of ICJ Hisashi Owada, 2010: 
“International law contains “NO 
PROHIBITION” on declarations of 
independence.”). 
This is the perspective of ICJ; and not solely 
peculiar to the head of ICJ; because, the tone 
of paragraph 81 is totally in this scope; read 
the whole paragraph 81; and its 
AFFIRMATIVE nature towards “NO 
VIOLATION” at the end. The meaning of P81 
in fact is implicitly loaded with “NO 
PROHIBITION” as well!
Question 4: After the partnership government 
collapsed, the Greek Cypriot led 
administration was recognized as the 
legitimate government of the Republic of 
Cyprus at the stage of the debates in New 
York in February 1964 ( Cyprus-Mail, 
09.03.2014 UNFICYP: a living fossil of the 
Cold War: http://cyprus-
mail.com/2014/03/09/unficyp-a-living-fossil-of-
the-cold-war ).
Does the UN SC have a right to:
– recognize the Flamans as the sole 
representator of Belgium (a country founded 
in partnership of Flamans and Wallons) if 
Flamans try to capture all of Belgium and try 
to kill all Wallons?
– recognize the Wallons as the sole 
representator of Belgium (a country founded 
in partnership of Flamans and Wallons) if 
Wallons try to capture all of Belgium and try to 
kill all Flamans?
– recognize the Czechs as the sole 
representator of Czechoslovakia (a country 
founded in partnership of Czechs and 
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Slovaks) if Czechs try to capture all of 
Czechoslovakia and try to kill all Slovaks?
– recognize the Slovaks as the sole 
representator of Czechoslovakia (a country 
founded in partnership of Czechs and 
Slovaks) if Slovaks try to capture all of 
Czechoslovakia and try to kill all Czechs?
– recognize the Greek Cypriots as the sole 
representator of Cyprus (a country founded in 
partnership of Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots) if Greek Cypriots try to capture all of 
Cyprus and try to kill all Turkish Cypriots?
Answer 4: Obviously No! UN SC has no right 
to remove a sovereignty of a people from the 
country that was founded in partnership with 
that people.
Question 5: What happened in Parliamentary 
Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE) after 
Greek Cypriots forcefully captured partnership 
government of 1960 in 1963?
Answer 5: Since Cyprus can be represented 
by only “mutual consensus” and “participation” 
of both of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots, all the repsentation of Cyprus was 
expelled from PACE, and between 1965-
1985, there were NO Cypriot representatives 
in PACE!
Question 6: Did Greek Cypriots try to kill all 
Turkish Cypriots?
Answer 6: Then–United Nations Secretary 
General, U Thant report (UN SG S/5950 
Report 10 September 1964, paragraph 180): 
“UNFICYP carried out a detailed survey of all 
damage to properties throughout the island 
during the disturbances; it shows that in 109 
villages, MOST OF THEM TURKISH 
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CYPRIOTS OR MIXED villages, 527 houses 
have been destroyed while 2,000 others have 
suffered damage from looting”
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%
7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chapter-VII-S-5950.pdf
“MOST OF THEM TURKISH CYPRIOTS OR 
MIXED” means “NONE OF THE SOLELY 
GREEK CYPRIOTS VILLAGES were 
destroyed”.
Akritas Plan (Killing every Turkish Cypriots) 
was applied by Greek Cypriots during 1963-
1974 and 2800 Turkish Cypriots (3% of then-
Turkish Cypriot population) were brutally 
massacred. Also, Turkish Cypriots were 
squeezed to the enclaves (3% of total area of 
whole Cyprus). 
Alexy Flemming
MIT, Massachusetts, MA
themainfanrian  October 9, 2013 at 9:21 pm - Reply
with Serbia now one of the leading countries in recognition of 
Kosovo independence it makes no sense for any nation not 
to recognize. Serbia has appointed an ambassador dejan pavicevic. has 
border guards and customs agents on its border with Kosovo. The 
border between Serbia and Kosovo in like any other international border 
in the world. Serbia has been promoting serbs voting on ballots in 
Kosovo that have the logo of the republic of Kosovo central elections 
commission that was established by the republic of Kosovo constitution. 
Dacic says serbias constitutions words on Kosovo are dead letter, 
nikolic says he is not president in Kosovo even thought Kosovo is in the 
Serbian constitution, vucic was a big part of the Brussels deal which 
abolished all Serbian autonomy and Belgrade institutions. Pristina 
appoints serb police commanders for serb areas who have to be loyal to 
pristina and all lawyers and judges have to be bound to pristina laws 
and kosovos constitution.
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andreas  April 19, 2014 at 5:25 pm - Reply
Lets wait and see what the future holds with thwe resolution 
of the crisis inUkraine
and i am sure we will notice a shift of power to the opposite direction 
( East Russia) if things go peacefully and smoothly as now go…..! and 
not like Irak and so on!!


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